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This paper estimates the impact of schooling on the timing of marriage and early fertility 
using the 2003 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey and duration analysis methodology. 
The source of exogenous variation in schooling is the extension of compulsory schooling in 
Turkey in 1997. The findings indicate that at age 17 –three years after the completion of 
compulsory schooling –, the proportion of women who are married drops from 15.2 to 10 
percent and the proportion of women who have given birth falls from 6.2 to 3.5 percent as a 
result of the new policy. This implies that the impact of increased schooling on marriage and 
early fertility persists beyond the completion of compulsory schooling for an important 
duration. In addition, the delay in the timing of first-birth is driven from the delay in the 
timing of marriage. After a woman is married, schooling does not have an effect on the 
duration until her first-birth. 
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1. Introduction  
A negative relationship between schooling and fertility is reported in several empirical 
studies (Schultz, 1998). A fall in fertility rates with higher schooling has several benefits, 
which are outlined by Schultz (2008). For instance, among the macro-economic implications 
of lower fertility are higher saving rates due to lower dependency ratios, especially at certain 
ages in the life-cycle. A lower fertility rate would also decrease maternal and child mortality 
and improve child and mother health in general. Furthermore, fewer children would allow 
women to have more training and work experience that would increase their productivity and, 
therefore, wages in the labor market. The quantity-quality theory of Becker (1960) implies 
that a low sibship size, as a result of lower fertility, would improve children’s schooling 
outcomes. As also pointed out by Schultz (2008), a lower fertility rate would exert an 
influence on several other economic decisions in the family that are jointly determined with 
fertility like a child’s migration and marriage, family labor supply, intergenerational transfers 
as well as household living arrangements. 
The literature on the link between schooling and fertility indicate that the rising levels 
of education must have been instrumental in lowering fertility. Delays in entry time to risk of 
marriage due to longer schooling years, heightened awareness towards the ills of marriage and 
giving birth at too early an age, better knowledge of contraceptive methods (Rosenzweig and 
Schultz, 1985, 1989), higher opportunity cost of raising children (Becker, 1981), lower infant 
mortality rates– which lowers the number of births needed to reach the desired family size – 
(Schultz, 1994), and higher bargaining power in fertility decisions for more educated women 
(Mason, 1986) are all possible channels through which education would influence the age at 
marriage and first-birth. 
The transition of women into motherhood in Turkey still takes place relatively early 
despite the rise in the average age of first-birth over time. The average age at first-birth was 
22.5 in 2003, up from 20.6 in 1983. Although remarkable improvements in education have 
also been recorded in Turkey, there is still room for improvement. The enrollment rate in 
secondary education was only 44 percent in 2000. Therefore, it becomes particularly 
important to understand the impact of increasing education on fertility in Turkey. 
An important characteristic of the transition into motherhood of women in Turkey is 
that almost all are married at the time of birth. In fact, the sociology literature reports such a 
rigid sequence of events of completion of education, marriage, and, birth of first child in other 
countries as well (Blossfeld and De Rose, 1992; Marini, 1984). A key fact here is that in this 
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sequence of events, the gap between age at marriage and first-birth is quite narrow in Turkey.1 
The lapse of time between marriage and first-birth is on average 1.8 years. Given this narrow 
gap between the timing of marriage and first-birth and the fact that marriage and schooling are 
generally incompatible events, a change in the timing of marriage as a result of increased 
schooling would directly translate into a change in the timing of early fertility as well. On the 
other hand, in a developed country where many women delay the birth of their first-child, a 
change in the timing of marriage due to increased schooling does not necessarily translate into 
delayed fertility as well. 
The paper aims to determine whether schooling has a causal impact on the timing of 
marriage and first birth in Turkey. While the issue is not new, most of the studies in the 
literature do not go beyond establishing a positive association between schooling and age at 
marriage and first-birth due mainly to the difficulty of controlling for unobservable factors 
that affect both schooling and age at marriage and first-birth. For instance, if individuals who 
have strong preference for schooling also have strong preference to marry late, a positive 
association between schooling and age at marriage will be observed. Failing to control for 
such unobservable factors would therefore result in an erroneous conclusion that schooling 
delays age at marriage. 
The literature that addresses this endogeneity problem in estimating the impact of 
schooling on marriage and fertility is scarce; the evidence for developing countries is even 
scarcer. This paper contributes to this literature by using a change in the compulsory 
education law in 1997 in Turkey as a source of exogenous variation in schooling. The cultural 
setting for marriage and fertility in Turkey – that 98 percent of women get married and that 
almost all births are to married women – makes it an excellent setting to study the impact of 
schooling on marriage and early fertility. 
At the beginning of the 1997-1998 school-year, compulsory schooling was raised from 
five to eight years in Turkey. As a result, children who were 11 years of age and younger in 
1997 were expected to remain in school for additional three years. Using the 2003 Turkish 
Demographic and Health Survey data and exploiting this exogenous change in schooling, we 
establish the causal impact of schooling on the timing of marriage and fertility among young 
women (ages 10-17 years) in Turkey. Due to the nature of our data set, we are only able to 
determine the impact of schooling on the timing of marriage and early fertility. However, the 
facts that many women marry young in Turkey and that a sizeable proportion exhibit high 
                                                 
1 This is partly due to the fact that 29 percent of ever-married women between the ages of 15-49 do not use birth 
control in Turkey. Among those who do, 40 percent rely on traditional methods.  
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fertility rates where the spacing between births is short – as a result of limited birth control 
use as well as preferences –imply that our findings on the timing of fertility could very well 
carry over to completed fertility to some extent as well. 
Our results indicate that schooling does indeed increase the age at marriage and age at 
first-birth. What is more interesting is that the impact of extension of compulsory schooling 
persists beyond the completion of compulsory schooling and the magnitude of this impact is 
large. At age 17, three years after the end of compulsory schooling, the predicted proportion 
of married women go down from 15 to 10 percent and the proportion of women who give 
birth goes down from 6.2 to 3.5 percent as a result of the policy. The fall in early fertility as a 
result of increased schooling is driven by the delay in the age at marriage; once a woman is 
married, we find no evidence of a delaying effect of schooling on fertility. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the timing of 
marriage and first birth in Turkey. Section 3 surveys the literature on the connection between 
schooling, age at marriage and first birth. Section 4 discusses the proposed methodology and 
the identification strategy used in the paper. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Timing of marriage and first-birth in Turkey 
Despite the rise in non-marital unions in the West, marriage as a social institution 
remains strong in Turkey. Almost 98 percent of women marry by age 49.2 In contrast, divorce 
is an unlikely event, with its rate estimated at less than 1 percent among 15-49 year-old 
women. Hence, it would not be incorrect to say that for an average woman in Turkey 
marriage is for life. Giving birth out-of-wedlock is even rarer than choosing an alternative 
living arrangement. According to DHS data, almost all births are to a married woman. Age at 
first birth is also closely linked to age at marriage; the lapse of time between marriage and 
first birth is, on average, 1.8 years. 
Marriage occurs early on in life. The average age at first marriage is 20.7 years among 
women aged 15-49. However, age at marriage and first-birth have been increasing and total 
fertility rate declining in Turkey (Figure 1). The DHS data indicate that age at marriage 
increased from 19.1 years in 1983 to 20.7 years in 2003 and first-birth from 20.6 to 22.5 years 
over the same time period. The total fertility rate, on the other hand, declined from 4.0 
                                                 
2 We do not distinguish between civil and religious marriages. The DHS data show that 91 percent of ever-
married women have both a civil and a religious marriage. Although the latter is not recognized under the law, 
the proportion of women with a religious marriage only is non-negligible estimated at 6 percent in 2003. The 
proportion of women that have civil marriage only is limited to 3 percent of ever-married women. 
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children per woman to 2.2 children per woman over the 20-year period. School enrollment 
has been on the rise as well. In 1990, while the net enrollment in 5-year compulsory schooling 
was 92 percent, despite the increase in compulsory schooling from five to eight year, it went 
up to 95.3 percent in 2000 (TUIK, 2007). Enrollment in secondary education has also 
increased from 26.4 percent in 1990 to 44 percent in 2000. Despite these achievements, 
considerable sex and regional differences remain. In 2000, there was almost a 10-percentage 
point difference between the enrollment rates of boys and girls in compuslory schooling. The 
gender gap was equally big in secondary education. 
  
3. Emprical Literature 
The empirical literature3 has generally confirmed the negative association between 
schooling and age at marriage and fertility both in developed and developing countries (see 
for instance, Raymo (2003), Blossfeld and Huinink (1991), Santow and Bracher (1994), 
Tawiah (1984) and Sathar et al. (1988)). Since most of the older studies do not tackle the 
problem of the endogeneity of schooling in demographic outcomes, it remains to be 
confirmed whether the observed relationships are causal. A small number of studies have tried 
to establish the causal impact of schooling on marriage and fertiltiy. While the results on the 
effect of education on completed fertility and marriage before age 49 is mixed, there seems to 
be a general agreement on the initial negative impact of schooling on age at first marriage and 
first birth.  
Breierova and Duflo (2004), for instance, find that education increases the age at 
marriage and reduces fertility in Indonesia using IV techniques. They identify the causal 
effect of schooling on demographic variables through the exposure of certain age groups to 
the massive schooling building program. Using a similar technique as Breierova and Duflo, 
Osili and Long (2007) also find a negative causal relationship between schooling and fertility 
in Nigeria. In establishing causality they exploit the fact that the universal primary education 
program in Nigeria has brought about an exogenous change in the schooling of children of 
certain age.  
Skirbekk, Kohler and Prskawetz (2004), on the other hand, exploit the fact that 
children in Sweden differ in age at school graduation due to their month of birth and use time-
to-event methodology to identify the causal impact of schooling. They find a negative causal 
                                                 
3 The simultaneous rise in women’s schooling and the fall in marriage rates in the West have spurred a 
theoretical interest on the reasons for the association between the two phenomena.The prominent theories in this 
areas are the marriage model of Becker (1973, 1991) and the search model of Oppenheimer (1988). 
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relationship between school graduation age and age at first marriage and first birth, but no 
effect on completed fertility or the probability of marriage by age 45. They interpret their 
findings as a ‘rigid sequencing of demographic events in early adulthood’ (p.547) and make a 
distinction between ‘social age’ – determined by individuals’ school cohort - and biological 
age, claiming that what matters for the demographic events is the former.   
Lefgren and McIntyre (2006), using IV methodology and birth month variation to 
bring about an exogenous change in the level of schooling in the US, arrive at the conclusion 
that the probability that women ever marries does not change with schooling but that marriage 
stability is enhanced.  
Brien and Lillard (1994) jointly model educational attainment, age at first marriage 
and first-birth for Malaysian women and thereby, account for the endogeneity of education 
and school enrollment in the latter two equations. The results show that a large part of the 
difference in age at first marriage among cohorts can be attributed to enrollment and 
completed education levels. In a similar vein, almost all the variation in age at first conception 
among women of different birth cohorts stem from delayed marriage among younger cohorts. 
The authors also note that treating education as exogenous to the timing of marriage and first 
conception, conditional on marriage, changed the hazards but not in a substantive way 
(p.1182). 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 The data we employ come from the 2003 round of the Demographic and Health 
Survey conducted by Hacettepe University of Turkey in cooperation with Macro 
International. The survey provides detailed information on the timing of marriage, first and 
consequent births on ever married women, as well as a rich set of individual and household-
level characteristics for both single and married women. The 2003 round surveyed 10,836 
households and 11,517 women between the ages of 15-49 across the country. From this data, 
we drew women between the ages of 10 and 25 totaling 7,659 cases from 5,245 households. 
 DHS collects data through a number of questionnaires. The information for this study 
comes from the ‘household questionnaire’ and the ‘women questionnaire’. While the former 
collects basic demographic information (including marital status) on all household members, 
the latter collects more detailed information on demographic variables including the timing of 
marriage and the re-productive history of women aged 15-49. Using both questionnaires, we 
construct retrospective event histories for marriage and first-birth. For marriage, the event 
history starts at age 10; for first-birth, it starts at age12 in accordance with the first age these 
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events are observed in the data. A drawback of the DHS data is that the retrospective data on 
marriage and fertility are only available through the ‘women questionnaire’ and for those aged 
15 and above. The marital status of the young women aged 12 to 14 can be obtained through 
the household questionnaire but not the timing of first-marriage. In the data, there were X 
number of young women (constituting X percent of 12-14-year-olds) who were reported to be 
married at the time of the survey. We have assumed that these women got married in the year 
of the survey. For young women aged 10-11 (XX cases), no information was availabe 
regarding their marital status. We have assumed these young women to be single at the time 
of the survey. In regards to fertility and the timing of first-birth, information is only available 
for women aged 15 and above. Since giving birth out-of-wedlock is an extremely rare event in 
Turkey and the earliest age at which a birth is observed is 12 years (and given that, on 
average, the first-birth is not realized before 1.8 years following marriage), we would expect 
the number of cases missed to be less X percent of 10-24-year-olds.   
Using the DHS data, Figure 1 shows the hazard function for marriage among young 
women, who are the subject of this study. The hazard function is hump-shaped. In other 
words, the likelihood of getting married for the first time is low at very young ages, increases 
very fast when women reach 14-16 years, reaches a peak at around 21 years and declines 
there on. At age 21, the hazard rate for marriage is above 10 percent. The survivor function in 
Figure 2 illustrates the share of unmarried women remaining in the sample by age. While by 
age 12 less than 1 percent of women are married, this figure increases to 1.6 percent by age 
14, to 4 percent by age 15, to 8.2 percent by age 16, and to 14.2 percent by age 17. By age 22, 
46.8 percent of women are married. 
The hazard function for first-birth, given in Figure 3, mimics the marriage function, 
with the exception that it is positioned at older ages. The probability of giving first-birth is 
very low for women younger than 15 years. This probability increases for those aged 15 and 
older, reaching a peak at age 22. The survivor function for first-birth shown in Figure 4 
illustrates that the probability of not giving birth by age 15 is 99 percent. This probability 
drops to 97 percent for women aged 16 and to 93 percent for women aged 17. By age 22, 36 
percent of women have given birth. 
 
5. Empirical Methodology and Identification Strategy 
Estimating the impact of schooling on marriage/fertility decisions using a standard 
OLS estimation is problematic because the right-hand-side variable in this case, schooling, is 
a decision variable that is jointly determined with marriage and fertility decisions. Therefore, 
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this analysis would not yield the causal impact of schooling, which we seek to find in this 
paper. In order to capture this causal impact, we need a source of exogenous variation in the 
schooling decision that would not have a direct impact on the marriage and fertility decision. 
We use the variation in years of compulsory schooling across different birth cohorts to 
identify the impact of schooling on marriage and fertility decisions. The validity of our 
instrument should be obvious as there is no reason to expect a direct impact of the change in 
compulsory schooling on marriage and fertility decisions of women. In order to examine the 
relevance of our instrument, we compare the school enrollment rates of 8- to 14-year-old girls 
before and after the change in policy using the 1993 and 2003 DHS data. When we compare 
the enrollment rates until age 10, we see very similar levels in 1993 and 2003 (Table 1). In 
fact, the enrollment rates for 10-year-old girls at 1993 and 2003 are identical. However, 
starting at age 11 – as some children make their transition to the sixth grade level –, 
enrollment rates at 1993 and 2003 start to diverge. The gap between the enrollment rates in 
the two years become substantial for 12-year-old and older girls. While 58.8 percent of 12-
year-old girls were enrolled in school in 1993, this percentage jumped to 87.7 percent in 2003.  
The gap between the enrollment rates in the two years in fact rises above 30 percent for 13-
year-olds. Therefore, we can assert for sure that our instrument is in fact relevant and that the 
change in compulsory schooling duration brought about a substantial increase in the school 
enrollment rates at ages targeted by the policy. 
 
Table 1 Enrollment Rates by Age over Time 
Year Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12 Age 13 Age 14 
1993 90.5 93.1 91.8 79.8 58.8 49.6 43.1 
2003 90.5 94.9 91.8 92.6 87.7 81.2 67.4 
 
Since compulsory schooling in Turkey was extended from five to eight years at the 
beginning of the 1997-1998 school year, all students who completed grade four or lower 
grades at the end of the 1996-1997 school year (or who started grade four or lower grades in 
September 1996) were bound by the new policy. In other words, compulsory schooling was 
for eight years for all students who started the first grade in September 1993 or later; but it 
was five years for those who started earlier. 
Unfortunately, we do not have the information on school starting age of children in 
our sample. Therefore, using the year-of-birth information, we make an assumption on school 
starting age based on children’s current age. Children generally start school after they 
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complete age six in Turkey. However, it is not uncommon, especially in rural parts of the 
country, to delay starting school to age seven. (According to the 2003 DHS, while 52 percent 
of the 6-years-olds are in school, 87 percent of 7-year-olds are.) Since the new compulsory 
schooling system affected children who started school at of after September 1993, we chose to 
assume that children who were born in 1986 or later were bound by the new policy. 
We use duration analysis as the estimation method since both marriage and fertility 
decisions fit well into the time-to-event framework. A child enters the risk set at a certain age 
(which is taken as 10 in the marriage analysis and as 12 in the fertility analysis according to 
the first age at which these events are observed), and exits when a marriage and fertility takes 
place or the child turns 25-years-old. A child could also exit the risk set before age 25 without 
a marriage/fertility decision if the child is younger than 25 in 2003; in this case, she exits at 
whatever age she is in 2003. For some children, the duration is censored in the right because 
either the child does not marry/give birth until age 25 or the last age she is observed in the 
sample (for those who are younger than 25 in 2003). 
The data is arranged in a person-age format in the estimation. For a child who is 10 
years old in 2003 (1993 birth-cohort), there is only one row in the data where age is 10 and 
year is 2003. On the other hand, for a child who is 15 years old in 2003 (1988 birth-cohort), 
there are six rows in the data: one for each age from 10 to 15 (or for each year from 1998 to 
2003). 
In order to identify the impact of the new compulsory schooling policy, we generate a 
policy dummy variable. Table 2 shows how the value of this policy variable varies over the 
birth-cohorts and ages that are included in our sample. When the calendar years are in bold, 
the policy dummy variable takes the value of 1; otherwise, the policy variable is zero. For all 
birth cohorts after 1986, the policy variable is one at all ages. For the 1986 birth cohort, it is 
one after age 11 (calendar year 1997) because the policy was not expected before 










Table 2 Policy Dummy Variable According to Birth-Cohorts and Age 
Age 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 … 25 
Birth 
Cohort 
2003             1993 
2002 2003            1992 
2001 2002 2003           1991 
2000 2001 2002 2003          1990 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003         1989 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003        1988 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003       1987 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003      1986 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003     1985 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003    1984 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003   1983 
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 … 2003 1978 
 
Since different birth cohorts attend a certain grade level at different calendar years, it 
becomes critical to disentangle the effects of calendar years on education – like a steady 
improvement in enrollment rates over time – from the effect of the change in the compulsory 
schooling policy, which is implemented at a certain point in time. Our identification strategy 
purges the impacts of these two factors. We use the variation in the policy dummy variable 
across different birth cohorts in identifying the impact of year dummies. For instance, while 
the policy variable takes the value of one in 2003 for birth cohorts after 1986, it is zero in 
2003 for the rest of the birth cohorts as can be seen in Table 2. A similar issue arises in 
purging the impact of the policy variable from age effects. Here, the source of identification is 
again the variation across birth-cohorts. For instance, when we examine the first column in 
Table 2 (where age is 10), we see that the policy dummy is one for birth cohorts after 1987 
and zero otherwise. This separates the effect of the policy variable from the age effects. Of 
course, this identification strategy assumes that there is no direct impact of year-of-birth 
variable; i.e. at a given age and calendar year, all year-of-birth cohorts would display the same 
marriage and fertility behavior. 
There exists another complication in the estimation arising from the change in the 
Civil Code: Prior to 2002, the Civil Code stipulated age 15 as the minimum age for marriage 
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for women in Turkey.4. In line with the more egalitarian spirit of the new Civil Code, the age 
at marriage was equated for men and women so that the legal age of marriage was increased 
to 17 years for women as well.56 Therefore, the new law made a difference for 15- and 16-
years-old girls in 2002 and 2003. In Table 2, the cells for which the new Civil Code is in 
effect are underlined. A dummy variable is used to control for the effect of this policy change. 
In the duration analysis, we use a logistic form for the hazard function. The baseline 
hazard function we choose is non-parametric: we use a piece-wise constant baseline hazard 
(where the waiting time concept is age); therefore, we have age dummies for ages 10 to 25. In 
certain specifications, we also allow the impact of the policy variable to vary according to the 
baseline hazard variable in order to see any differential impact of the policy at different age 
values. In particular, we interact the policy variable with three age groups: ages 10 to 12, ages 
12 to 14, and ages 15 to 17. 
In the empirical specification, in addition to the two policy control dummy variables 
and age as well as year dummies, we also control for the geographic location (by including 
interaction terms of the 12 NUTS region dummies with the rural dummy as well as dummy 
controls for large city and small city, where the baseline is town) and wealth (five dummy 
variables are generated for each quintile where the lowest quintile is the baseline). 
  
6. Results 
 In this section, we present the results of duration analysis on the timing of marriage 
and fertility. To ease discussion, we report the odds ratios that show how the probabilities 
change given a change in the variable of interest. As discussed earlier, the causal effect of 
education is identified through the ‘policy’ variable – the change in the compulsory schooling 
law - that has brought about an exogenous change in the schooling of some children but not of 
others.  
  
6.1. Impact of Education on the Timing of Marriage 
 The results presented in Table 1 indicate that there is evidence, statistically significant 
at five percent level, that an increase in schooling – measured by the policy variable – reduces 
the probability of marriage before age 18. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of the policy 
has been large: the odds of marriage before age 18 is 36 percent lower for children who have 
                                                 
4 Under unusual circumstances such as pregnancy and with parental consent and court decree, a female child as 
young as 14 years could get married.  
5 Again, under unusual circumstances, a 16-year-old is allowed to get married.  
6 The Law went into effect on January 1st, 2002. 
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been affected by the new education policy. In contrast, the change in the civil code had no 
impact on the probability of marriage before age 18. The latter result may stem from the fact 
that in the present study we consider both civil and religious marriages, whereas the civil code 
only affects the former. Nevertheless, these results indicate that while the policy that aimed at 
changing the timing of marriage had no effect, the change in education policy – that did not 
have such an aim – achieved the desired outcome.  
  
Table 3 Odds ratios for the probability of marriage 
 Model I Model II 
0.633**  Policy [0.131]  
 1.389 Policy*Ages 10-11  [1.215] 
 0.435** Policy*Ages 12-14  [0.147] 
 0.753 Policy*Ages 15-17  [0.189] 
0.775 0.652 Change in civil code [0.254] [0.230] 
Number of subjects 7,659  
Number of failures 1,621  
Time at risk 58,234 58,234 
Pseudo R squared 0.1959 0.1961 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%; 
and *** significance at 1%. Other covariates include wealth indices, place of residence and its size, 
single age groups and year dummies. Wealth index is measured based on household durables and 
housing facilities.    
  
In an alternative specification (Model II), we try to pinpoint more precisely the ages 
around which this fall in the risk of marriage has occurred due to the policy. We do this by 
interacting the policy variable with three age groups: ages 10-11, 12-14 and 15-17.7 The 
results, which are shown in the second column of Table 3, indicate that the probability of 
marriage has registered a decline around ages 12 to 14. (This is statistically significant at five 
percent level.) The odds of marriage at ages 12-14 is reduced by 54 percent due to the policy. 
This is quite a significant decline. We do not observe a fall in the odds of marriage before age 
11, probably because there are very few children who marry before this age. Nor does there 
exist evidence of a decline in the risk of marriage between ages 15 and 17. Although the odds 
ratio is less than 1 showing that the risk has been reduced, the impact is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
                                                 
7 The sample size does not allow single age categorizations. 
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 The interpretation of the above results is that the education policy has directly affected 
the marriage probability of 12- to 14-years-old girls– who were now required to stay in school 
longer - but not of girls who were beyond the compulsory school age. However, the fact that 
the marriage probability in the 15-17 year-age group did not increase following the policy 
change implies that there has not been a catching up effect through an increase in the risk of 
marriage right after the end of compulsory schooling. If girls were delaying their marriage 
decision only because of the fact that schooling and marriage are incompatible events, we 
would expect the girls who would marry between the ages of 12 and 14 before the new policy 
to marry as soon as they complete the new compulsory schooling years. As a result, an 
upsurge in the risk of marriage right after the end of compulsory schooling at around age 15 
would take place. However, such an upsurge is not observed. Therefore, we can assert that the 
effect of schooling extends beyond the delay it creates in exposure time. Three years after 
most girls complete the new compulsory schooling the impact of longer schooling years on 
marriage is still felt. In fact, according to the estimates in Table 3, the predicted proportion of 
girls married by age 17 drop from 15.2 percent to 10 percent with the implementation of the 
new policy. 
 At this point it is important to emphasize that the effects of education on the timing of 
marriage reported in Table 3 are obtained after controlling for year effects. As noted earlier, a 
gradual increase in the age at marriage has been occurring in Turkey, part of which probably 
results from a secular increase in the marriage age. Indeed, the year effects, reported in 
Appendix Table 1, are all statistically significant pointing to the existence of a secular time 
trend. Ignoring the time effects would unduly exaggerate the effect of schooling on the timing 
of marriage. To show the magnitude of the bias, we repeat the same analysis as before but 
ignore the time effects. Appendix Table 1 (column 3) shows that doing so would lead to the 
conclusion that the odds of marriage before age 18 are lower by 66 percent due to increased 
schooling. This is a considerably larger effect than found earlier, which was 36 percent. 
 To complete the discussion on the timing of marriage, we now briefly discuss the 
effects of other covariates. As would be expected, the risk of marrying before age 18 is lower 
among women from wealthier households (see Appendix Table A1). The wealth effect 
strengthens as a household’s position in the wealth distribution improves. While the 
probability of marrying before age 18 does not differ between women from the lowest and 
second lowest wealth quintiles, those from the third and fourth quintiles have 16 and 28 
percent lower odds of marriage in comparison to the poorest group, respectively. Among 
women from the top wealth quintile, the odds are down by 58 percent. 
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 Place of residence also affects the probability of marrying young. Women from large 
cities are less likely to marry before age 18 than women from smaller town and cities. 
Regional differentiation also exists in the probability of marriage before age 18. Women 
residing in any other region but Istanbul tend to have a higher likelihood of marrying at a 
given age, with the expectation of those in the Aegean. Finally, the age effects are all 
statistically significant and positive indicating that the risk of getting married increases as 
women age.  
Notwithstanding these findings, it is important to note that the effect of policy remains 
robust to the inclusion of other covariates. This is not a surprising result given that the 
covariates included in the model are all orthogonal to the policy change. 
 
6.2. Impact of Education on the Timing of First-Birth 
 Table 4 displays the estimates on the impact of the policy change on the first-birth 
decisions for two different specifications. The first specification provides evidence, at five 
percent level of statistical significance, that schooling decreases a woman’s probability of 
giving birth to her first child before age 18. More specifically, the odds of giving birth at a 
given age are reduced by 45 percent as a result of the policy. This is quite a dramatic change. 
Based on the estimates in Table 4, we calculate that the predicted proportion of women giving 
birth to their first child by age 17 drops from 6.2 percent to 3.5 percent with the 
implementation of the new policy. 
In the second specification, the interaction of the policy variable with the two age 
groups - ages 12-14 and 15-17 - indicate that the drop comes from the reduced first-birth 
probability for women in the latter group. The probability of first-birth is also reduced among 
12-14 year-olds but the effect is not statistically significant, whereas there is evidence at five 
percent statistical significance that the probability of first-birth at ages 15 to 17 has decreased. 
These findings are consistent with what we found earlier for the timing of marriage. As noted 
earlier, giving birth out-of-wedlock is an extremely rare event in Turkey. That the age at 
marriage has registered an increase due to policy implies an increase for the age at first-birth 
as well and this is what we find. Moreover, that the impact of change in policy on marriage is 
most prominent at ages 12 to 14 is also consistent with the fact that the impact of policy 





Table 4 Odds ratios for the probability of first birth 
 Model I Model II 
0.554**  Policy [0.162]  
 0.872 Policy*Ages 12-14  [0.547] 
 0.518** Policy*Ages 15-17  [0.168] 
Number of subjects 7,659 7,659 
Number of failures 1,206 1,206 
Time at risk 45,753 45,753 
Pseudo R squared 0.1802 0.1802 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%; 
and *** significance at 1%. Other covariates include wealth indices, place of residence and its size, 
single age groups and year dummies. Wealth index is measured based on household durables and 
housing facilities.    
 
 The estimates for the rest of the control variables are provided in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. A secular increase in the age at first-birth is observed, which again parallels the 
secular increase in the age at marriage noted earlier. Re-estimating the effect of policy on the 
age at first-birth in the absence of year controls increases the effect of policy dramatically, 
showing that a woman’s probability of giving birth to her first child is reduced by 72 percent 
due to the policy. Age controls are also statistically significant and increasing, showing that 
the probability of giving birth increases with age. The wealth controls are also significant 
except for the bottom three groups indicating that while the probability of giving birth to their 
first child at a given age does not statistically differ among women in the bottom 60 percent of 
the wealth distribution, for those in higher income groups the risk is lower compared to the 
poorest group. The wealth effect is again strongest for women in the highest wealth quintile: 
in comparison to the poorest group, the odds of giving birth to their first child for women in 
the top quintile is 59 percent lower than that for women in the lowest quintile. The size of the 
place of residence is again important with women from cities having lower probabilities of 
giving birth before age 18 in comparison to women from small towns. In parallel to the 
regional variation observed in the timing of marriage, women living in Istanbul and the 
Aegean have a lower likelihood of giving birth to their first child at a given age than women 
in other regions. It is interesting to note the close parallelism in the impact of regions on the 
timing of marriage and first-birth. In 19 out of 23 regional dummies, the magnitude of the 
coefficients and their level of significance are similar. In other words, the regions where 
women have higher likelihood of marriage at a given age are also where they have a higher 
likelihood of giving birth to their first child. 
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6.3. Impact of Education on the Timing of Fertility among Ever-Married Women 
 Finally, we look at the effect of policy on the timing of first-birth among ever-married 
women and try to answer the following question: once a woman is married, does an increase 
in schooling reduce the probability of giving birth to the first-child at a given age? The answer 
we get is a “no”. Although the effect of the policy is negative, it is not statistically significant 
(Table 5). In other words, once married, schooling does not change the timing of first-birth. 
This result implies that the source of the increased age at first-birth that we noted earlier must 
be the delayed age at marriage. In regards to the timing of first-birth, we find a ‘rigid 
sequencing of events’. This is not surprising given that childlessness is not common in Turkey 
– only 1 percent of ever married women are childless at the end of their reproductive period - 
and that there is a social pressure on the couple to demonstrate the ‘femininity’ of the bride 
and the ‘masculinity’ of the groom by producing an offspring. Added evidence comes from 
time series data showing that the lapse of time between age at marriage and first birth has not 
registered significant increases over time although, as mentioned earlier, age at marriage has 
increased and total fertility declined. Results derived from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 DHS 
consistently show that the birth interval has remained stable over time at 1.8 years. Total 
fertility rate, on the other hand, has decreased by 19 percent over the same period. 
 
Table 5 Odds ratios for the probability of first birth among ever-married women 
 Model I Model II 
0.863  Policy [0.248]  
 1.830 Policy*Ages 12-14  [1.302] 
 0.788 Policy*Ages 15-17  [0.248] 
Number of subjects 1,621 1,621 
Number of failures 1,206 1,206 
Time at risk 3,959 3,959 
Pseudo R squared 0.028 0.029 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%; 
and *** significance at 1%. Other covariates include wealth indices, place of residence and its size, 
single age groups and year dummies. Wealth index is measured based on household durables and 
housing facilities.    
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we used a change in the duration of compulsory schooling in Turkey as a 
source of exogenous variation in education to find its causal impact on the timing of marriage 
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and early fertility. We find that education does indeed have a negative impact on marriage and 
early fertility. The impact of the extension of compulsory schooling on marriage decisions is 
the strongest at ages 12 to 14, i.e. the additional years girls were required to stay in school. 
However, its impact persists beyond the completion of compulsory school. The proportion of 
married women at age 17 drops from 15.2 to 10 percent after the policy is implemented. The 
impact of the extension of compulsory schooling on early fertility is also strong and 
particularly felt at ages 15 to 17. The proportion of women who give birth by age 17 falls 
from 6.2 to 3.5 percent as a result of the new policy. We also find that the negative impact of 
education on fertility is mostly driven from the negative impact of education on marriage. A 
higher level of education does not change the timing of fertility once a woman is married. 
The finding that the impact of the extension of compulsory education on marriage and 
early fertility persists three years beyond the completion of compulsory school in Turkey is 
important. In a similar paper investigating the causal impact of education on marriage and 
early fertility decisions in Sweden, Skirbekk et al. (2004) find that extension of compulsory 
schooling has a timing effect but not a stock effect (completed fertility do not change). 
Similarly, we report a timing effect in Turkey. However, unlike Sweden, we would expect the 
timing effect to exert a much stronger influence on the stock due to the high fertility rates in 
Turkey – we have not been able to test this, though—. Early fertility and short spacing 
between births, partly as a result of limited use of modern contraceptive methods and partly 
due to preferences – is a much more frequent phenomenon in Turkey. Therefore, a change in 
the timing is likely to result in a change in stock for a sizeable number of women. 
A change in the timing of marriage and fertility, even though it does not make an 
impact on the stock, could still be important. The health literature boasts evidence indicating 
the negative health effects of marriage and child birth at too early of an age on mothers and 
children. Given that infant mortality still hovers rather high in Turkey, estimated at 29 per 
1000 births, any measure that can reduce this rate is welcome. While health measures are 
often thought to be the key in improving health outcomes of children and mothers, education 
policies can be rather important as well. Among other things, by increasing the age at 
marriage and first birth education can impact positively on these outcomes, especially when 
marriage among adolescents is non-negligible and control on own fertility is limited. 
Beginning with the 2006 school year, high school education in Turkey is extended 
from three to four years and the currently debated issue is whether to increase compulsory 
schooling further to include high school education. This papers shows that the debate on 
compulsory schooling also needs to consider the possible advantages it will bring through 
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delayed marriage, reduced fertility and improved health outcomes of children and mothers. 
Extension of compulsory schooling until age 18 (including high school education) could make 
a large difference in marriage and early fertility patterns given our findings on the 
incompatibility of schooling and marriage as well as the persistence of the effect of increased 
schooling on marriage and fertility beyond the completion of compulsory schooling. The 
incompatibility of schooling and marriage suggests that marriage and early fertility would 
drop significantly at ages 15 to 18. However, compliance with a policy of extension to ages 
15 to 18 could be lower than the compliance to a policy of extension to ages 12 to 14 – the 
policy change considered in the paper-, reducing the policy’s effect on the timing of marriage 
and fertility. On the other hand, the fraction of children whose schooling behavior would 
change with such a new policy would be higher as fewer students attend high school, 
increasing the impact of policy on the timing of demographic events. Another issue 
concerning the extension of compulsory schooling to cover high school years is in regards to 
persistence of the effect of increased schooling on marriage and early fertility beyond 
compulsory schooling years. As noted earlier, we have found the effect to persist at least three 
years beyond compulsory schooling when the affected group was 12-14-year-old girls. Given 
that the treatment group will be older (15-17-year-olds), it is not clear whether and how long 
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Table A1 Odds ratios for the probability of marriage 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
0.633** 0.341***Policy [0.131] [0.063]
1.389Policy* Age 10-11 [1.215]
0.435**Policy*Age 12-14 [0.147]
0.753Policy*Age 15-17 [0.189]
0.775 0.652 0.824Change in civil code [0.254] [0.230] [0.269]
0.888 0.888 0.898Wealth quintile 2 [0.088] [0.088] [0.088]
0.837* 0.838* 0.832*Wealth quintile 3 [0.084] [0.084] [0.083]
0.722*** 0.722*** 0.728***Wealth quintile 4 [0.074] [0.074] [0.074]
0.423*** 0.423*** 0.433***Wealth quintile 5 [0.050] [0.050] [0.050]
0.599*** 0.599*** 0.597***Resides in large city [0.100] [0.100] [0.099]
0.867 0.867 0.879Resides in small city [0.102] [0.102] [0.102]
0.879 0.879 0.847Istanbul - rural [0.309] [0.309] [0.321]
0.514*** 0.514*** 0.506***West Marmara [0.113] [0.113] [0.110]
0.457** 0.457** 0.445**West Marmara – rural [0.154] [0.154] [0.151]
0.759 0.759 0.752Aegean [0.143] [0.143] [0.138]
0.798 0.797 0.746Aegean –rural  [0.199] [0.199] [0.185]
0.826 0.826 0.791East Marmara [0.142] [0.142] [0.138]
0.585** 0.585** 0.574**East Marmara – rural [0.156] [0.156] [0.153]
0.692** 0.692** 0.677**West Anatolia [0.116] [0.116] [0.114]
0.437*** 0.437*** 0.437***West Anatolia – rural  [0.126] [0.126] [0.125]
0.731** 0.730** 0.707**Mediterranean  [0.108] [0.108] [0.104]
0.362*** 0.362*** 0.355***Mediterranean – rural [0.084] [0.084] [0.082]
0.648** 0.648** 0.623**Central Anatolia [0.123] [0.123] [0.118]
0.95 0.949 0.904Central Anatolia – rural [0.233] [0.233] [0.223]
0.504*** 0.503*** 0.506***West Black Sea [0.106] [0.106] [0.106]
West Black Sea - rural 0.538** 0.538** 0.511***
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[0.131] [0.131] [0.124]
0.299*** 0.299*** 0.286***East Black Sea [0.068] [0.068] [0.065]
0.419*** 0.419*** 0.394***East Black Sea - rural [0.128] [0.128] [0.119]
0.616** 0.616** 0.571***Northeast Anatolia [0.120] [0.120] [0.111]
0.545** 0.545** 0.522***Northeast Anatolia –rural [0.133] [0.133] [0.127]
0.715* 0.715* 0.689**Central East Anatolia [0.134] [0.134] [0.128]
0.682 0.683 0.667*Central East Anatolia – rural [0.163] [0.163] [0.157]
0.931 0.93 0.907Southeast Anatolia [0.157] [0.157] [0.153]
0.453*** 0.453*** 0.436***Southeast Anatolia - rural [0.094] [0.094] [0.089]
11.721** 11.466** 10.463**Age 11 [12.700] [12.358] [11.214]
14.545** 18.508** 10.700**Age 12 [15.983] [21.397] [11.378]
54.386*** 72.417*** 30.918***Age 13 [60.963] [87.372] [31.755]
245.328*** 323.197*** 127.772***Age 14 [266.327] [378.927] [129.142]
559.892*** 687.744*** 272.920***Age 15 [607.252] [805.940] [274.742]
1,106.365*** 1,367.593*** 469.232***Age 16 [1,200.238] [1,602.125] [471.889]
1,739.888*** 2,125.701*** 672.268***Age 17 [1,886.686] [2,492.096] [675.083]
2,127.495*** 2,626.040*** 764.630***Age 18 [2,309.433] [3,079.055] [768.106]
2,666.942*** 3,289.788*** 912.249***Age 19 [2,897.503] [3,860.497] [916.703]
3,136.109*** 3,868.239*** 1,007.508***Age 20 [3,411.967] [4,544.659] [1,013.181]
3,534.970*** 4,357.039*** 1,080.741***Age 21 [3,852.051] [5,126.583] [1,088.563]
3,007.916*** 3,709.287*** 851.250***Age 22 [3,287.918] [4,375.708] [859.515]
2,870.282*** 3,548.909*** 724.694***Age 23 [3,155.483] [4,206.544] [735.715]
2,773.760*** 3,430.211*** 688.322***Age 24 [3,107.633] [4,136.538] [713.693]
3,232.643*** 4,036.090*** 654.321***Age 25 [3,704.420] [4,957.198] [692.546]
0.32 0.275*Year 1991 [0.227] [0.202]
0.286** 0.238**Year 1992 [0.176] [0.148]
0.367* 0.316*Year 1993 [0.214] [0.188]
0.280** 0.243**Year 1994 [0.161] [0.143]
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0.164*** 0.143***Year 1995 [0.095] [0.085]
0.235** 0.206***Year 1996 [0.133] [0.120]
0.198*** 0.174***Year 1997 [0.113] [0.101]
0.198*** 0.174***Year 1998 [0.113] [0.101]
0.176*** 0.154***Year 1999 [0.100] [0.090]
0.181*** 0.160***Year 2000 [0.103] [0.093]
0.121*** 0.106***Year 2001 [0.069] [0.062]
0.136*** 0.120***Year 2002 [0.078] [0.070]
0.093*** 0.080***Year 2003 [0.053] [0.047]
Time at risk 58,234 58,234 58,234 
R squared 0.1959 0.1961 0.1899 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. Wealth index is measured based on household durables 
and housing facilities. Reference categories are the lowest quintile for the wealth index, urban 
areas of Istanbul for the 12 regions of the country, towns for settlement size, age 10, and year 
1990. 
 
Table 2A Odds ratios for the probability of first-birth 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
0.554** 0.281***Policy [0.162] [0.075]
0.872Policy*Age 12-14 [0.547]
0.518**Policy*Age 15-17 [0.168]
0.88 0.879 0.893Wealth quintile 2 [0.098] [0.098] [0.098]
0.837 0.837 0.831Wealth quintile 3 [0.097] [0.097] [0.096]
0.714*** 0.714*** 0.722***Wealth quintile 4 [0.083] [0.083] [0.084]
0.414*** 0.413*** 0.421***Wealth quintile 5 [0.056] [0.056] [0.057]
0.542*** 0.542*** 0.540***Resides in large city [0.105] [0.105] [0.103]
0.759** 0.759** 0.771*Resides in small city [0.103] [0.103] [0.103]
0.999 0.999 0.949Istanbul - rural [0.412] [0.412] [0.412]
0.516*** 0.516*** 0.506***West Marmara [0.132] [0.132] [0.129]
0.429** 0.429** 0.418**West Marmara – rural [0.172] [0.172] [0.167]
0.698 0.698 0.697Aegean [0.167] [0.167] [0.161]
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0.766 0.766 0.717Aegean –rural  [0.218] [0.218] [0.204]
0.811 0.811 0.772East Marmara [0.167] [0.167] [0.161]
0.591* 0.591* 0.580*East Marmara – rural [0.187] [0.187] [0.182]
0.826 0.826 0.809West Anatolia [0.158] [0.158] [0.155]
0.528** 0.528** 0.528**West Anatolia – rural  [0.169] [0.169] [0.166]
0.79 0.79 0.763Mediterranean  [0.136] [0.136] [0.131]
0.427*** 0.426*** 0.418***Mediterranean – rural [0.111] [0.111] [0.108]
0.627** 0.627** 0.605**Central Anatolia [0.142] [0.142] [0.136]
0.992 0.992 0.936Central Anatolia – rural [0.277] [0.277] [0.261]
0.491*** 0.490*** 0.490***West Black Sea [0.122] [0.122] [0.121]
0.573* 0.573* 0.542**West Black Sea - rural [0.165] [0.165] [0.155]
0.350*** 0.350*** 0.332***East Black Sea [0.091] [0.091] [0.087]
0.404*** 0.404*** 0.380***East Black Sea - rural [0.141] [0.141] [0.132]
0.794 0.794 0.733Northeast Anatolia [0.176] [0.176] [0.162]
0.468*** 0.468*** 0.448***Northeast Anatolia –rural [0.135] [0.135] [0.128]
0.82 0.819 0.794Central East Anatolia [0.177] [0.177] [0.170]
0.761 0.761 0.744Central East Anatolia – rural [0.202] [0.202] [0.195]
1.082 1.082 1.046Southeast Anatolia [0.211] [0.211] [0.203]
0.484*** 0.484*** 0.465***Southeast Anatolia - rural [0.115] [0.115] [0.109]
1.974 2.015 1.817Age 13 [1.146] [1.161] [1.057]
1.234 1.291 1.013Age 14 [0.810] [0.851] [0.627]
11.578*** 13.340*** 8.385***Age 15 [6.395] [7.766] [4.167]
35.738*** 41.387*** 22.020***Age 16 [18.831] [23.125] [10.432]
83.050*** 96.117*** 42.846***Age 17 [44.232] [53.710] [20.226]
128.609*** 148.473*** 60.653***Age 18 [68.443] [82.948] [28.429]
181.707*** 209.815*** 84.649***Age 19 [97.102] [117.678] [39.668]
193.200*** 223.098*** 86.015***Age 20 [103.689] [125.609] [40.368]
Age 21 208.489*** 240.737*** 89.164***
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[112.560] [136.299] [42.038]
305.829*** 352.929*** 119.378***Age 22 [166.001] [201.130] [56.623]
301.222*** 347.328*** 107.477***Age 23 [166.833] [201.403] [52.144]
303.900*** 350.001*** 96.798***Age 24 [173.693] [208.935] [48.413]
188.181*** 216.343*** 46.551***Age 25 [120.341] [143.205] [26.374]
1.052 0.961Year 1991 [0.654] [0.627]
0.97 0.863Year 1992 [0.561] [0.531]
0.445 0.393Year 1993 [0.255] [0.237]
0.414 0.365*Year 1994 [0.230] [0.215]
0.423 0.373*Year 1995 [0.235] [0.220]
0.427 0.376*Year 1996 [0.238] [0.222]
0.43 0.378*Year 1997 [0.240] [0.223]
0.397* 0.349*Year 1998 [0.220] [0.206]
0.338* 0.298**Year 1999 [0.189] [0.176]
0.310** 0.274**Year 2000 [0.173] [0.162]
0.191*** 0.169***Year 2001 [0.108] [0.101]
Time at risk 45,753 45,753 45,753 
R squared 0.1802 0.1802 0.1739 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. Wealth index is measured based on household durables 
and housing facilities. Reference categories are the lowest quintile for the wealth index, urban 




Table 3 Odds ratios for the probability of first-birth among married women 
 Model 1 Model 2 
0.863  Policy [0.248]  
1.83 Policy*Age 12-14 [1.302] 
0.788 Policy*Age 15-17 [0.248] 
0.995 0.995 Wealth quintile 2 [0.112] [0.113] 
0.982 0.981 Wealth quintile 3 [0.105] [0.105] 
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0.937 0.936 Wealth quintile 4 [0.100] [0.100] 
0.869 0.868 Wealth quintile 5 [0.110] [0.110] 
0.934 0.935 Resides in large city [0.146] [0.146] 
0.846 0.847 Resides in small city [0.111] [0.111] 
1.449 1.451 Istanbul - rural [0.399] [0.399] 
0.927 0.934 West Marmara [0.233] [0.236] 
0.835 0.834 West Marmara – rural [0.326] [0.325] 
0.913 0.914 Aegean [0.269] [0.269] 
1.076 1.079 Aegean –rural  [0.254] [0.255] 
1.069 1.071 East Marmara [0.196] [0.197] 
1.002 1.003 East Marmara – rural [0.294] [0.294] 
1.481** 1.482** West Anatolia [0.235] [0.235] 
1.814** 1.792** West Anatolia – rural  [0.467] [0.467] 
1.307 1.31 Mediterranean  [0.219] [0.220] 
1.22 1.223 Mediterranean – rural [0.290] [0.290] 
0.962 0.961 Central Anatolia [0.222] [0.222] 
1.207 1.208 Central Anatolia – rural [0.327] [0.328] 
1.174 1.174 West Black Sea [0.247] [0.247] 
1.253 1.254 West Black Sea - rural [0.309] [0.309] 
1.075 1.075 East Black Sea [0.267] [0.267] 
0.998 0.999 East Black Sea - rural [0.256] [0.257] 
1.632** 1.631** Northeast Anatolia [0.363] [0.363] 
0.727 0.727 Northeast Anatolia –rural [0.205] [0.204] 
1.337 1.338 Central East Anatolia [0.275] [0.276] 
1.304 1.301 Central East Anatolia – rural [0.320] [0.319] 
1.617** 1.617** Southeast Anatolia [0.304] [0.304] 
1.282 1.286 Southeast Anatolia - rural [0.269] [0.270] 
Age 13 0.738 0.789 
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[0.542] [0.583] 
0.096*** 0.109*** Age 14 [0.079] [0.091] 
0.355 0.459 Age 15 [0.245] [0.340] 
0.572 0.75 Age 16 [0.393] [0.556] 
0.87 1.142 Age 17 [0.595] [0.839] 
1.062 1.387 Age 18 [0.727] [1.015] 
1.216 1.588 Age 19 [0.835] [1.166] 
1.033 1.349 Age 20 [0.710] [0.992] 
0.914 1.193 Age 21 [0.633] [0.882] 
1.331 1.735 Age 22 [0.928] [1.292] 
1.225 1.594 Age 23 [0.868] [1.204] 
1.19 1.546 Age 24 [0.867] [1.194] 
0.744 0.965 Age 25 [0.586] [0.799] 
1.362 1.177 Year 1991 [0.813] [0.736] 
1.79 1.475 Year 1992 [1.020] [0.895] 
1.107 0.895 Year 1993 [0.615] [0.532] 
0.838 0.676 Year 1994 [0.455] [0.393] 
0.921 0.744 Year 1995 [0.488] [0.422] 
0.973 0.784 Year 1996 [0.512] [0.444] 
1.08 0.869 Year 1997 [0.573] [0.495] 
1.034 0.833 Year 1998 [0.544] [0.471] 
1.042 0.84 Year 1999 [0.554] [0.481] 
1.029 0.833 Year 2000 [0.547] [0.474] 
0.661 0.537 Year 2001 [0.356] [0.309] 
Time at risk 3,959 3,959 
R squared 0.0283 0.0285 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. Wealth index is measured based on household durables 
and housing facilities. Reference categories are the lowest quintile for the wealth index, urban 
areas of Istanbul for the 12 regions of the country, towns for settlement size, age 12, and year 
1990. 
